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ESSAY
Decoding Guilty Minds:
How Jurors Attribute
Knowledge and Guilt
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Morris B. Hoffman8
Owen D. Jonese
Kenneth W. SimonsK2
A central tenet of Anglo-American penal law is that in order for
an actor to be found criminally liable, a proscribed act must be
accompanied by a guilty mind. While it is easy to understand the
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importance of this principle in theory, in practice it requiresjurors and
judges to decide what a person was thinking months or years earlierat
the time of the alleged offense, either about the results of his conduct or
about some elemental fact (such as whether the briefcase he is carrying
contains drugs). Despite the central importance of this task in the
administrationof criminal justice, there has been very little research
investigatinghow people go about making these decisions, and how these
decisions relate to their intuitions about culpability. Understandingthe
cognitive mechanisms that govern this task is importantfor the law, not
only to explore the possibility of systemic biases and errors in
attributionsof culpability but also to probe the intuitions that underlie
them.
In a set of six exploratory studies reported here, we examine the
way in which individuals infer others' legally relevant mental states
about elemental facts, using the framework established over fifty years

ago by the Model Penal Code ("MPC'). The widely adopted MPC
framework delineates and defines the four now-familiarculpable mental
states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Our studies
reveal that with little to no training,jury-eligibleAmericans can apply
the MPC framework in a manner that is largely congruent with the basic
assumptions of the MPC's mental state hierarchy. However, our results
also indicate that subjects' intuitions about the level of culpability
warrantingcriminalpunishment diverge significantly from prevailing
legal practice;subjects tend to regard recklessness as a sufficient basis
for punishment under circumstances where the legislatures and courts
tend to requireknowledge.
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INTRODUCTION

All across America, every day, we ask jurors to decide what some
stranger, who stands accused of criminal behavior in the past, was
thinking at the time of his alleged crime. That's hard to do. And despite
the fact that the task is ubiquitous, and crucial to the government's
legitimacy in depriving citizens of physical liberty, the ways that jurors
actually impute mental states to defendants is almost entirely
unknown. If jurors aren't operating the way the legal system assumes
they are, then gross injustices-wrongful convictions and wrongful
acquittals-may be pervasive.
Cognitive science has provided some clues. We have learned
some of the cognitive mechanisms at play when a person attempts to
infer another's state of mind and intentions. 3 And these "theory of
mind" studies have even begun to uncover the neural foundations for
taking the perspective of another. 4 Yet the law's interest, more
specifically, is in how potential jurors attribute mental states to
defendants while operating under established legal frameworks. Little
empirical research has addressed that issue.5
3.

See generally IAN APPERLY, MINDREADERS: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF "THEORY OF MIND"

(2011).
4.
See, e.g., R. Saxe et al., UnderstandingOther Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology
and FunctionalNeuroimaging,55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 87 (2004).
5.
See Matthew R. Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen
D. Jones, Rend Marois & Kenneth W. Simons, The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327,
1331-34 (2014) (summarizing the extant literature).
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The legal frameworks are quite specific. As most readers will
recall, statutes typically require both a bad act (actus reus) and a
culpable mental state (mens rea) for criminal liability to attach.
Further, most states follow the Model Penal Code's ("MPC") approach
of using a hierarchy of culpable mental states (which correspondingly
calibrate the crime committed and the punishment earned). Although
state implementations vary somewhat, the MPC's mental state
hierarchy includes these: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. 6
A 2011 article published by several of us cut initial inroads into
how jury-eligible subjects applied the MPC framework to mens rea
determinations. In that study-Sorting Guilty Minds 7-we provided
subjects with short written criminal scenarios in which an interior
sentence provided a transparent window into the mental state of a
harm-causing protagonist. For instance, when the actor was reckless,
we told subjects that: "The offender was aware of a substantial risk that
his actions would cause the victim's death." We then asked subjects, in
various interconnected experiments, either to sort these different
mental states by MPC categories or instead to simply choose
appropriate punishment amounts.
Those experiments revealed two troubling things. First,
although subjects could appreciate the differences in language that
communicated a blameless actor compared to one acting with purpose
to cause a harmful result, subjects had much more trouble
distinguishing between negligent, reckless, and knowing actors.
Second, the punishments subjects imposed suggested they do not see
any consistent moral distinction (which law often assumes) between
reckless and knowing actors. 8
As with any groundbreaking research, Sorting Guilty Minds
raised as many questions as answers. Two of those unanswered
questions are central to the new research and results reported here.
First, how do subjects impute mental states when they are not given a
transparent window into the thoughts of defendants? Second, how do
subjects map mental states, as they have been defined by the MPC, onto
judgments about criminal culpability?
The six new experiments reported here, generously funded by
the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and

6.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§

2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).

7.
Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene & Ren6 Marois,
Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011).
8.
Our 2014 article confirmed and extended these results by demonstrating that the
difficulties subjects experienced were not simply semantic. For even when the language used to
define and communicate mental states was clarified, the reckless and knowing mental states
remained relatively indistinguishable to subjects. Ginther et al., supra note 5, at 1360.
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Neuroscience, 9 provide the first rigorously empirical answers to those
questions. Each experiment sheds important new light on how juryeligible subjects actually perform the mind-reading tasks our criminal
justice system assigns to them.
For example, our studies reveal that, with little to no training,
jury-eligible Americans can apply the MPC framework in a manner that
is largely congruent with the basic assumptions of the MPC's mental
state hierarchy. At the same time, however, our results also provide
cause for concern. For instance, subjects' intuitions about the level of
culpability warranting criminal punishment diverge significantly from
prevailing legal assumptions and practice, because subjects tend to
regard recklessness as a sufficient basis for punishment even under
circumstances in which the legislatures and courts tend to require
knowledge.
We proceed in three Parts. Part I provides background and
context, and introduces the common elements and basic design of our
experiments. Part II presents the key findings. Part III discusses their
implications-including for deepening our understanding of juror
behavior, for further informing potential efforts at reform, and for
future research.

I. EXPLORING MENTAL STATE ATTRIBUTION
To be
conduct but
requirement
mens rea,1 0

convicted, one must not only have engaged in prohibited
must ordinarily have done so with a guilty mind. The
of establishing a guilty mind, commonly referred to as
is a predicate of modern criminal statutes" and has

See generally MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. & NEUROSCIENCE,
9.
http://www.lawneuro.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6H7C-UL7U].
10. The term mens rea is adopted from the longstanding legal axiom of actus reus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea, or "the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty." This famous phrase
dates back at least approximately one thousand years. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 974, 983 (1932).
11. This is perhaps no more evident than in modern drug laws. A recent survey indicates that
forty-eight of the fifty states require that a defendant both have possession of the drugs and know
he is possessing illegal drugs as an element of the offense. The two exceptions are Florida and
Washington, where state legislatures have eliminated this knowledge provision in favor of an
affirmative defense. See State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 423 n.1 (Fla. 2012) (Pariente, J.,
concurring) (citing a survey done in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 646-49 (1988), though
correcting for North Dakota revising the law to include a willfulness provision and Florida's
decision in Adkins upholding the constitutionality of a statute without a knowledge requirement);
State v. Bradshaw, 98 P.3d 1190 (Wash. 2004). Even then, in both Florida and Washington
defendants charged under the statute are provided the opportunity to raise the affirmative defense
that they did not have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. Id. ("[Tihe defendant can
concede all elements of the offense but still coherently raise the 'separate issue' . . . of whether the
defendant lacked knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance." (citation omitted));
City of Kennewick v. Day, 11 P.3d 304, 310 (Wash. 2000) (noting the affirmative defense is
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constitutional significance, as illustrated by recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 1 2 And the requisite mens rea must be established
separately for each element of the offense. Broadly construed, these
elements are categorized as pertaining either to the defendant's
conduct, to the result of the conduct, or to the attendant circumstances.
In previous work we explored how well subjects could
distinguish different mens rea language as it pertained to the result
elements of an offense. This is important, for instance, because in many
states a jury finding of a purposeful (P) or knowing (K) killing could
yield decades in prison, while a finding that the same killing was
reckless (R) or negligent (N), in the alternative, could result in as little
as probation. 13 And yet we found our subjects struggled to differentiate
the language associated with knowing and reckless conduct.
The importance of differentiating mental states is not limited to
result elements. It is often, in fact, more crucial for circumstance
elements.
For result elements, the significance that mens rea plays in
grading homicide offenses is largely focused on whether the defendant
purposefully, knowingly, or merely recklessly caused the victim's death.
However, there are few other instances where mens rea as to a result
plays as critical a role.
With circumstance elements, by contrast, disputes about mens
rea as to attendant circumstance elements are quite frequently at the
crux of culpability determinations. In most (though not all1 4 ) statutes

available by "one of two alternative showings: (1) that the defendant did not know he was in
possession of the controlled substance ...; or (2) that the defendant did not know the nature of the
substance he possessed" (citation omitted)).
12. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (holding that "[s]ilence does not suggest
that Congress dispensed with mens rea for the element . . . at issue"); United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69, 77-78 (1994) (declining to enforce the plain meaning of the statute
criminalizing distribution of child pornography and instead creating a knowledge requirement
with respect to the elements of the age of the minor performers and the sexually explicit nature of
the material).
13. See Shen et. al., supra note 7, at 1348 n.98 (noting that "[m]ost states use either the K/R
distinction as an express distinction in the definition of levels of homicide, or effectively do so by
making K an aggravator to an R homicide").
14. Even if the defendant did not know that a material circumstance existed, some criminal
statutes permit a criminal conviction if he or she was aware of a "substantial risk" that it did
("recklessness") or if he or she should have been aware of such a risk under an objective standard
("negligence"). In rare cases, criminal liability may be "strict" because no mens rea is required for
the material circumstance. The typical case is statutory rape where even a non-negligent belief
that the underage party was over the statutory age would not be exculpatory. For its part, the
MPC strongly discourages the use of strict liability for all but minor violations but does make a
single exception in the case of statutory rape of a child under the age of ten. MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 213.4(4), 213.6(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1980). For a more thorough discussion of strict liability
offenses, see generally Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1075 (1997).
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in which a material circumstance is part of the offense, knowledge of
the inculpatory circumstance is the threshold requirement for criminal
liability. For example, even if a defendant transports hazardous waste
without a permit, he's not generally guilty of any crime at all unless he
knows the waste was hazardous. He might have been negligent in not
knowing, or even reckless in taking the chance. But for this crime, as
for many circumstance crimes, knowledge is required for liability to
attach. This same analysis differentiates innocent and guilty conduct
across a number of different offenses. For example, did he know there
were drugs in his car? Did he know the kid he just sold alcohol to was
underage? Did he know that the tax return didn't include all his
income? Did he know that the car he received was stolen? Did he know
the chemicals were going to be used to make methamphetamine? Did
he know that his emails contained classified material? In this way,
compared to decoding guilty minds for result elements, decoding guilty
minds as they pertain to circumstance elements is both a much more
ubiquitous and consequential task in assessing culpability under a
criminal statute. For this reason, the present study focuses its
examination solely on circumstance elements.
Given its importance, defining the contours of what exactly
constitutes a "guilty mind" has been a central issue in criminal law
throughout history. 15 Modern legislation usually follows the Model
Penal Code's four-part approach to categorizing mental states. 16 With
respect to circumstance elements, the relevant mental states are
defined as follows by the MPC.1 1
> Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a
circumstance when he is aware that the circumstance
exists.
> Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a
circumstance when he consciously disregards a
risk that the
substantial and unjustifiable
circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation

15. Sayre, supra note 10, at 988.
16. For an exposition of the historical development, see Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of
Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815 (1980).
17. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). We note that while "purposefulness"
is defined by the MPC, it practically never applies for circumstance elements. Consideration of the
defendant's purposefulness regarding the existence of a circumstance arises only in relation to
inchoate offenses.
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from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor's situation.
> Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to
a circumstance when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive
it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct
and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation.
> Blamelessly. A person acts blamelessly when he does
not have any of the culpable mental states defined
above.
Variations of this language appear in a majority of jurisdictions
in the United States.1 8 Even jurisdictions that have not legislatively
endorsed the MPC's approach often employ its mental state
categories.1 9 The Supreme Court has frequently done so in recent years
when interpreting federal statutes that lack an explicit mens rea
requirement. 2 0
Given the MPC's wide adoption and influence, our empirical
focus in this study is on how everyday subjects understand and apply
the MPC's culpability hierarchy when decoding the mental state of
others. To achieve this, we employed six interrelated experiments. In
all of them, jury-eligible subjects read a series of short scenarios online
and then answered a question. (Details on the subjects appear in
Appendix A.) Each scenario presented a series of facts about a fictional
protagonist named "John." The scenarios were designed to enable lay
subjects to characterize John's mental state. We used a "fact patternscenario" paradigm in which we crafted nine distinct (or "core") fact
patterns, each of which we could alter slightly in order to communicate
evidence compatible with attributions of different mental states. 21

18. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability:
The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 691-92 (1983).
19.

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 33 (4th ed. 2006) ("[C]ourts, on their

own, sometimes turn to the Model [Penal] Code and its supporting commentaries for guidance.").
20. An example is the 2016 decision in Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016). In
analyzing the scope of the statutory language "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" involving
the "use ...
of physical force," the Court relied entirely on MPC mental state categories. Id. at
2276. It held that reckless assaults, no less than knowing or intentional assaults, were embraced
by this language. Id. at 2282.
21. This was similar to the approach taken in Ginther et. al., supra note 5, and Shen et. al.,
supra note 7.
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"Scenario," as used here, and as illustrated momentarily, refers to an
individual, mental-state-specific version of the core fact pattern.
Each of the nine core fact patterns involved a different criminal
offense. Each offense used in our experiments has an attendant
circumstance element. We ensured that our fact patterns spanned a
spectrum of wrongful conduct, ranging from selling alcohol to a minor
to harboring a fugitive, and we used a preliminary study to validate
that we were successful in this regard. 22 Table 1 lists the nine core factpattern offenses used in our experiments.
TABLE 1: THE CORE FACT PATTERNS
Basic Fact Pattern

Attendant Circumstance

Drug Trafficking: John is accused of Did John know that the drugs were in his
driving a car over the border with drugs trunk?
in the trunk.
Theft by Receiving: John is accused of Did John know that the goods were
stolen?
buying goods that were stolen.
Sale of Alcohol to Underage Person: John Did John know that the person was
is accused of selling alcohol to an underage?
underage person.
Statutory Rape: John is accused of Did John know that the person was
underage?
having sex with an underage person.
Tattoo of a Minor: John is accused of Did John know that the person was a
minor?
giving a tattoo to a minor.
Illegal Hiring: John is accused of hiring a Did John know that the person was not
person not authorized to work in the authorized to work in the United States?
United States.
Harboring a Fugitive: John is accused of Did John know that the individual was a
fugitive?
harboring a fugitive.
Insurance Fraud: John is accused of Did John know that the submitted claim
contained false information?
filing a false claim.
Unlawful Carrying of Loaded Firearm: Did John know that the firearm was
John is accused of carrying a loaded loaded?
firearm in public.
I

Unbeknownst to subjects, we generated four different scenarios
from each of the nine core fact patterns. Specifically, each of the core
fact patterns yielded one scenario each for the knowledge, recklessness,
negligence, and blameless mental states. 23 For instance, there were four
different versions of the drug trafficking fact pattern, and each of these
four varied only in the mental state dimension. In Table 2 we show how
this worked for a single, illustrative scenario.
22. Data on file with author and available upon request.
23. Again, the mens rea of purposefulness almost never applies to circumstance elements.
See supra note 17.
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Each fact pattern was a paragraph in length, ranging from 80 to
160 words. The complete set of fact patterns is provided in Appendix B.
For context, each fact pattern also included a simplified version of the
relevant criminal statute. 2 4 For instance, the drug trafficking fact
pattern began with the statement: "A person is guilty of unlawful
trafficking of illegal drugs if the person transports an illegal drug." 2 5
Each fact pattern then proceeded with one or two introductory
sentences that set up the facts relevant for that fact pattern. For
example, the drug trafficking fact pattern always started with:
"John is an American citizen who regularly travels to
Nogales, a Mexican town near the U.S. border where
John has many relatives, including an uncle. Several of
John's relatives have told John that his uncle hangs out
with local drug dealers."
These opening facts were the same in each of the knowledge,
recklessness, negligence, and blameless scenarios.
Following
the
opening
facts,
the
second
component
communicated information bearing on John's mental state. As an
example, the blameless scenario version of the fact pattern provided:
"When he travels, John makes every effort to avoid
interacting with his uncle, but one night despite all the
precautions John takes, when John is asleep the uncle
secretly breaks into John's car and hides a large
package of cocaine inside the spare tire compartment,
where it is not visible to the naked eye."
The final sentence of the scenario completed the facts, making
clear that the circumstance in question was present. This final sentence
was also, like the opening facts, identical across each of the four mental
state scenarios generated for each fact pattern. For example, in the drug
trafficking fact pattern, all four scenarios ended with the text:
"When John tries to re-enter the United States, the
border patrol agents who inspect John's car at the border

24. These statutes were not meant to reflect the language of any specific jurisdiction.
25. Except where otherwise noted in specific experiments below, all language pertaining to
the required mental state for culpability was excised from the statute. This was because we were
not interested in testing subjects' ability to interpret the statute, but rather the facts of the
scenario themselves.
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open up the package given to John by his uncle and find
that it contains cocaine."
Constructed in this way, our fact patterns resembled the typical
circumstance case in the real world: there is no doubt that the
circumstance exists (e.g., the drugs were in the car), but there is
potentially much doubt about whether the actor knew those drugs were
in the car or was aware of the possibility that the drugs were in the car.
The key aspect of this experimental design is that we
manipulated the surrounding circumstances to strengthen or weaken
the inferences that might be drawn about John's awareness of the
material facts, while controlling other aspects of the fact pattern. This
manner of manipulating the scenarios reflects the realities of criminal
trials wherein the mental state of another person at a particular time
(specifically whether or not that person was aware of a particular fact
or suspected it) is inferred from their behavior and from the
surrounding circumstances.
We recognize that in the case of recklessness, negligence, and
blamelessness, the application of these concepts also includes value
judgments about whether the person (John) should have refrained from
acting as he did in our scenarios. Recognizing this, we constructed our
scenarios to vary the circumstances to "best fit" the distinctions drawn
by the MPC drafters between knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and
blamelessness. Specifically, we constructed four kinds of scenarios
designed to convey different fits, which we have labeled "manifest
knowledge," "awareness of risk," "negligently unaware," and
"blameless."
The "manifest knowledge" scenarios include objective evidence
about John's own conduct tending to show that he knows, as in this
example, that drugs are in the trunk of the car (e.g., he opens the duffel
bag containing the drugs, looks inside it, and puts it in the trunk). These
are meant to elicit the conclusion that John had actual knowledge of the
circumstance in question. Because knowledge is directly demonstrated
through the facts of the scenario, we regard all responses other than
knowledge to be erroneous.
The "awareness of risk" scenarios, by contrast, only include
inferential evidence about the circumstances. This inferential evidence
includes John's observations of the behavior of other people. For
example, in the same fact pattern as above, John's uncle, who associates
with drug dealers, pays him one hundred dollars to bring a duffel bag
across the border. As part of the scenario we tell subjects that "[h]is
sister says 'I don't think that's a birthday present . . .' but his uncle says
(with a wink towards John) that 'it's just coffee.'" Based on the totality
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of the circumstances, we think the best fit for these scenarios is
recklessness, but knowledge and even just negligence could also be
plausible responses, depending on a subject's judgment about the
strength of the appropriate inferences.
The "negligently unaware" scenarios include evidence that
would make some people suspicious but wouldn't necessarily make
everyone suspicious, and was thus intended to elicit negligence as the
best fit. Using the same example, subjects are told that "John's uncle
gives John a giftwrapped package to bring to a friend, and when John
asks what's in the box, John's uncle says it is a birthday present for the
friend." For these scenarios, we define the best fit as negligence, but
recklessness and blamelessness are plausible responses.
Finally, the "blamelessness" scenarios include evidence that the
person takes active and reasonable precautions to avoid criminal
conduct and thus is not criminally culpable. Again using the same
example, "[w]hen he travels, John makes every effort to avoid
interacting with his uncle, but one night despite all the precautions
John takes, when John is asleep the uncle secretly breaks into John's
car and hides a large package of cocaine inside the spare tire
compartment, where it is not visible to the naked eye." Based on the
circumstances presented, we regard all responses aside from blameless
to be erroneous.
For all experiments, we randomized the order in which subjects
encountered the scenarios and mental states. Subjects read one and
only one scenario from each of the nine fact patterns. After reading each
scenario, subjects were asked to answer a question, which varied (as
described in the next Section).
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II. THE Six EXPERIMENTS

A. Experiment 1: Attributing Mental States Using MPC Definitions
The MPC has established a hierarchy of mental states relating
to the circumstance elements of an offense. Experiment 1 set out to
answer a straightforward question: Do subjects reliably apply this
hierarchy as the drafters assumed they would? We presented subjects
with the scenarios, as described above, and then asked them to select
the wrongdoer's mental state, with a prompt specific to the mental state
in question. For example, in the case of the drug trafficking scenario,
subjects were asked:
"Which of the following mental states best describes
John's mental state as to the fact that drugs are in the
bag?"
Following that prompt, subjects were provided with the four
mental states and their definitions and asked to select which best
represented the mental state of John as to the pertinent circumstance. 26
The results from Experiment 1, summarized in Table 3,
demonstrate that the typical juror grasps the hierarchy established by
the Model Penal Code. The leftmost vertical column indicates what we
refer to as the best fit mental state. Moving rightward, each column
identifies in turn the mental state actually selected by subjects for those
scenarios. More specifically, the cells with figures indicate the
percentage of subjects who selected a given mental state described in
the top row, for each scenario type described in the leftmost column. For
instance, 6% of subjects attributed a negligent state of mind to
protagonists in scenarios intended to describe manifest knowledge. The
gray-shaded diagonal of cells, from the upper left to the lower right,
identifies the percentage of subjects that identified the best fit for the
protagonist's mental state.

26. The definitions were the MPC definitions, save for two slight modifications. First, because
the MPC definitions were written to apply not only to circumstance elements but result and
conduct elements as well, we excised the results- and conduct-based components from each of the
definitions we provided (with minor rephrasing so it worked as a stand-alone sentence). Second,
we customized each definition so it referred to the specific facts in each scenario. For instance, we
changed the definition of "knowingly" from "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to the
attendant circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances exist" to "[a] person acts
knowingly with respect to the duffel bag containing illegal drugs when he is aware that the drugs
are in the bag."
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TABLE 3: JuRY-ELIGIBLE AMERICANS CAN APPLY THE MPC
FRAMEWORK IN A MANNER THAT Is LARGELY CONGRUENT WITH
THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MPC's MENTAL STATE
HIERARCHY
Scenarios
Knowing

Subject Chose:
Reckless
Negligent

Blameless

81%

12%

6%

1%

28%

40%

30%

2%

Negligently
Unaware of
Risk

8%

28%

53%

11%

Blameless

3%

4%

20%

74%

Manifest
Knowledge
Aware of Risk

As expected, we observed high correspondence between subjects'
responses and our best fit response for the manifest knowledge and
blamelessness scenarios-81% and 74%, respectively. However, for our
''aware of the risk" and "negligently unaware of the risk" scenarios,
there was the possibility of multiple plausible responses, and
concordantly the correspondence between subjects' responses and what
we labelled the best fit was commensurately lower-40% and 53%,
respectively. In addition to correspondence between responses and the
best fit, we examined how individuals tended to err in their responses.
In other words, did individuals tend to err towards more or less culpable
determinations? For "aware of the risk" scenarios, subjects were about
as likely to select negligence (30%) as knowledge (28%). However, for
the "negligently unaware of the risk scenarios," subjects strongly erred
towards ascribing awareness of the risk to the offender, with 28%
selecting recklessness, while only 11% selected blamelessness.
A graphic depiction of the subjects' performance in applying the
MPC definitions to the scenarios is displayed in Figure 1, below. The
black shading represents the best fit between the MPC mental states
and the evidence described in scenarios, while the lightest gray shading
represents clearly erroneous responses. Dark gray reflects responses
that were plausible but inclined towards greater culpability, while midgray reflects responses that were plausible but inclined towards less
culpability. Generally speaking, the subjects tended toward the best fit,
27
but they also varied in their attributions.
27. One interesting empirical question is whether individual subjects show state- or traitbased differences in how they ascribe mental states. Our data is not well-suited to answer this
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FIGURE 1: APPLYING MPC MENTAL STATE DEFINITIONS
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B. Experiment 2: Subjects' Unguided Moral IntuitionsAbout What
Mental State Is Sufficient for CriminalLiability
What level of culpability do individuals regard as sufficient for
punishment? Experiment 2 was designed to ascertain how ordinary
jury-eligible persons would answer this question when given free rein
to do so: we asked them to decide whether or not they would convict
John without giving them a mens rea instruction. In other words, after
evaluating a scenario, they were asked to apply a statute that contained
only an actus reus, with no mention of any requisite mens rea for the
attendant circumstance. By asking whether they would find the
defendant guilty under the statute, this question served as a proxy for
asking the subjects whether John's level of culpability, as demonstrated
in the particular scenario (i.e., our best fit scenarios for K, R, or N)
provided a sufficient basis for punishment.

question, though further research could evaluate the extent to which this may account for some of
the intersubject variability.
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For example, subjects evaluating the drug trafficking scenario
received the following prompt:
Criminal Statute for Unlawful Trafficking: A person is
guilty of unlawful trafficking of illegal drugs if the person
transports an illegal drug.
Based on the evidence provided do you think that
John is guilty of unlawful trafficking?
This question is similar to the types of questions that
psychologists ask when they use what are called "detection and
discrimination" tasks. Such tasks help to answer the question: What
type of information is necessary for an individual to draw a particular
conclusion? In the present case, this detection and discrimination
analysis applies because we are seeking to discover the level of
culpability (as defined by the MPC) that is sufficient for subjects to
return a guilty verdict under a statute that lacks any specific mens rea
requirement.
Figure 2 displays a "decision curve" that plots the percentage of
guilt determinations on the y-axis (vertical axis) and the mental state
on the x-axis (horizontal axis). This kind of plot allows us to examine
whether the shape of the decision curve presents a discrete "inflection
point"-that is, a disproportionate jump in percentages-as our
subjects move from sorting scenarios into one mental state to another.
If so, we call this point the "decision threshold." 28 The heavily shaded
line presents the average of all nine scenarios while the light dashed
lines present the average for each of the individual scenarios.

28. What we refer to here as a decision curve is equivalent to what psychologists refer to as
a psychometric function. The inflection points of these functions (where the slope is the highest or
where the second derivative is equal to zero) is a commonly used indicator of a sensory or decision
threshold in not only psychology, but signal detection more generally. For more information see
generally Neil A. Macmillan, Signal Detection Theory, in 4 STEVENS' HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Hal Pashler ed., 3d ed. 2002) (using inflection points as an indication of the location
of a decision or sensory threshold).
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FIGURE 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEST FIT MENTAL
STATE AND PERCEIVED CULPABILITY
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Our first finding in Experiment 2 is that there is substantial
variability across the nine scenarios, particularly for the "negligently
unaware of the risk" and "aware of the risk" categories. 29 This is,
however, consistent with the study design (which allowed a range of
plausible attributions of these two mental states) and with the finding
in Experiment 1 that the subjects varied substantially in their
selections when exposed to scenarios describing protagonists with these
two mental states. A second finding is that for all but two of the

29. A natural question would be: What are the characteristics of the scenarios that lead to
more culpability as opposed to less? While this is an interesting question and we provide the full
tables in the appendix, the study was not designed to make claims about individual scenario fact
patterns, and so we omit discussion of individual scenarios here since any conclusions would be
purely speculative. We do note, however, that linking scenario characteristics with intuitions
about culpability is an area of research we intend to explore.
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statutory contexts, four out of five subjects exposed to strong evidence
that the material circumstance was present (our best fit scenario for
recklessness) regarded this evidence as a sufficient basis for
punishment. Moreover, we found that two out of three subjects found
that weak, but suspicious, evidence of the material circumstance (our
best fit for negligence) was regarded as sufficient for criminal
punishment under the statute. The shape of the decision curve supports
the conclusion that the decision threshold for culpability exists at
negligence, with much more modest incremental increases in the
percentage finding guilt above the level of negligence.
In summary, when unguided by any instruction regarding the
mens rea required for conviction, most jury-eligible subjects find an
offender guilty even when the evidence of knowledge is murky. Why are
subjects so willing to convict on the basis of evidence that only raises a
suspicion that the actor was aware of the material circumstance? One
potential explanation lies in the results of Experiment 1, which
demonstrated that when evaluating such scenarios, individuals have a
bias towards attributing awareness when the evidence is ambiguous.
For example, in the scenarios where the best fit response was
negligence, three-fourths of the subjects who did not select negligence
selected knowledge or recklessness as opposed to blamelessness. This
finding suggests that jury-eligible adults tend to be willing to attribute
knowledge or awareness of risk (suspicion) to hypothetical defendants
based on equivocal evidence. Another possible explanation is that juryeligible adults find recklessness, and in many cases negligence, to be a
morally sufficient basis for criminal liability in the context of the
"circumstance" offenses explored in this study. In the sequence of
experiments beginning with Experiment 3 we attempt to disentangle
the subjects' attributions of mental state from their moral judgments
about liability.
C. Experiment 3: Use of Signals to Align Subjects'Responses with the
Best Fit Mental State
In order to make more precise connections between mental state
and culpability, we adopt from our previous two sets of published
experimentS 30 the use of "signals" to convey information about John's
mental state. For instance, to communicate that John was reckless in
the drug trafficking fact pattern, we told subjects, "John thinks there is
a good chance that the duffel bag contains illegal drugs." The text of all
signals is provided in Table 4.
30.

See Ginther et. al., supra note 5; Shen et. al., supra note 7.
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TABLE 4: SIGNALING LANGUAGE
Knowledge
John realizes [that the circumstance exists].
John knows [that the circumstance exists].
Recklessness
John thinks there is a good chance [that the circumstance exists].
John thinks it is quite possible [that the circumstance exists].
Negligence
It doesn't occur to John [that the circumstance might exist].
John does not suspect that [that the circumstance might exist].
John is distracted and does not consider [that the circumstance might exist].
John gives no thought to the possibility [that the circumstance might exist].

We used signals for K and R to push the "awareness of the risk"
scenarios towards either knowledge or recklessness, while we used the
negligence signals to buttress the fact that the "negligently unaware of
the risk scenarios" did, in fact, describe negligent conduct. So that
subjects did not think that the absence of a signal in the "manifest
knowledge" scenarios was indicative of anything, we also included
knowledge signals in those scenarios as well.
True, real jurors don't get direct access, like this, to a defendant's
prior thoughts. But the value of using explicit signals nonetheless, in
the present experiment, is to discover the relationships between the
mental states of offenders, on one hand, and subjects' intuitions about
culpability, on the other.
Experiment 3 repeated Experiment 1, with the sole difference
being the use of the "signaled" scenarios. The results from Experiment
3 are displayed in Table 5. As might be expected, the signaling language
had no significant impact on the responses to unambiguous scenarios
reflecting manifest knowledge and blamelessness, but it did nudge
subjects' responses toward the best fit mental state attributions for the
scenarios meant to reflect knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. In
general, the signaling produces results more in line with the best fit
mental state that was signaled in the scenario.
Specifically, when using the knowledge and recklessness signals
we were able to shift "awareness of risk" scenario responses-which had
previously been relatively evenly distributed among K/R/N
(28%/40%/30%) in Experiment 1-towards either K (which increased
from 28% to 67%) or R (from 40% to 58%), respectively. Similarly, the
responses to the "negligently unaware of the risk" scenarios shifted
toward negligence (from 53% to 63%), but more importantly, subjects
no longer displayed a robust predisposition to err towards awareness of
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the risk when the negligence signals were used (compare responses
selected for N scenarios in Table 3 with Table 5).
One question posed by these results is why the effect of the
signal was not even more substantial in aligning the answers with the
best fit mental state. The most likely explanation, in our view, is that
the information communicated in the scenarios is fairly complex,
including (1) several sentences about the surrounding circumstances
that were designed to raise different levels of suspicion about the
presence of the material fact, and (2) a simple declarative statement by
an omniscient observer about John's mental state. We suspect that the
complexity of the stimulus weakened the impact of the mental state
signal-which would have been determinative if it had been given by
itself without any additional evidence (because it would have amounted
to nothing more than a matching exercise). Nonetheless, the increased
accuracy and the removal of strong error biases in the case of negligence
provided us with greater precision with which to make conclusions
about how the typical juror assesses the culpability of an actor with
these prescribed mental states.
TABLE 5: APPLYING MPC MENTAL STATE DEFINITIONS WHEN MENTAL
STATE IS EXPLICITLY SIGNALED

Scenarios
Knowing

Manifest

Knwede
Knowledge
Aware of Risk
Signaled as
Knowledge
Aware of Risk
Signaled as
Recklessness
Negligently
Unaware of
Risk Signaled
as Negligence
Blameless

Subject Chose:
Negligent
Reckless

Blameless

76%

16%

6%

1%

67%

21%

12%

0%

18%

58%

24%

0%

1%

20%

63%

16%

2%

5%

16%

78%
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D. Experiment 4: Subjects' Unguided Intuitions About Culpability
Sufficient for Criminal Liability: Revisited
In Experiment 3 we repeated the procedures of Experiment 1,
but using signals to nudge subjects towards the best fit mental state in
each scenario. Having established in Experiment 3 that this was largely
successful, in Experiment 4 we repeated the procedures of Experiment
2, except again using signals to clarify subjects' intuitions about the link
between mental state and culpability. Again, we included statutory
definitions of the offenses applicable to each fact pattern that did not
include a mens rea requirement.
Our data, plotted in Figure 3, reveal a key new finding: First, as
compared with Figure 2, the variability among scenario fact patterns
was significantly reduced, as intended. But most significantly, the data
show that for most people, the decision threshold of culpability lies
between negligence and recklessness. To see this from the Figure,
notice that there are nine dashed lines, each of which shows the
subjects' decision curve for one of the nine given scenarios. The dark,
unbroken line is the average of those nine. The inflection point is
recognizable at the negligence-recklessness boundary, which reflects
the largest (and therefore steepest) jump up, from the prior mental
state, in the percentage of subjects willing to convict. Indeed, as Figure
3 depicts, the percentage willing to convict jumped from under 50% for
those exposed to the scenarios signaled as negligence to over 80% of
those exposed to the scenarios signaled as recklessness.
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FIGURE 3: RECKLESSNESS IS A THRESHOLD FOR CULPABILITY
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Note that there is very little difference between the proportion
of people finding an offender guilty if he had a mens rea of recklessness
(82%) compared to a mens rea of knowledge (88%), even if it was
manifested by conduct (91%). Put another way, for a large proportion of
the subjects, recklessness was both necessary and sufficient for
conviction.

To be clear, this doesn't mean that people find perpetrators with
knowledge to be only a few percentage points more blameworthy than
people performing the same act recklessly. And it doesn't mean that
people somehow think that those with knowledge should only be
punished a few percentage points above the punishments that the
reckless receive. What it does suggest is that roughly 80% of the
population-if interpreting a statute without any mention of the mens
rea requirement as to a relevant circumstance (that is, unconstrained
by mental state categories, of the MPC or otherwise)-appears to
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believe that the mental state the law tends to call "reckless" is fully
sufficient to warrant a guilty verdict and conviction.
Of course, this finding immediately suggests the tantalizing
question to investigate next: Would instructing the subjects about the
mens rea required for conviction by the applicable statutes make any
difference?
E. Experiment 5 The Effect of Instructions
Experiment 4 showed that most subjects required recklessness
(awareness that the circumstance might exist) before they were willing
to find John criminally liable, but did not require knowledge that the
circumstance actually existed. We designed Experiment 5 to assess the
subjects' response to an instruction requiring knowledge as the mens
rea before criminal liability would attach. Put another way, would
expressly informing subjects that the statute actually required
knowledge push the culpability threshold up from recklessness to
knowledge? Experiment 5 thus had to differ in two ways from
Experiment 4.
First, at the beginning of Experiment 5 we provided subjects
with an instruction page similar to the guidance provided by a judge to
a jury. This page instructed subjects on the basics of element analysis
and how bad acts need to be accompanied by a culpable mental state in
order to hold an individual criminally responsible. 3 1 We also provided
subjects with slightly modified versions of the MPC's definitions of
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. 32 And we instructed them to
carefully note the mental state demands of the statute.
Second, we altered each statute to expressly require knowledge
as an element. This addition, alone, appeared bolded in the statute
presented to subjects. For example, for the drug trafficking fact pattern,
subjects were told:
"A person is guilty of unlawful trafficking of illegal drugs
if the person knowingly transports an illegal drug."

31. The instruction read as follows:
A crime is committed when the defendant has performed an illegal act accompanied
by a culpable mental state. That means proof of the commission of the act alone is not
sufficient to prove that a crime has been committed. The defendant must also have a
culpable mental state to certain attendant circumstances such as someone's age.
Culpable mental state means either knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as described
below.
32. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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The bolded term-"knowingly"-was defined immediately below the
statute and in a manner specific to the facts of the case.
Despite these explicit directions, the results from Experiment 5
indicate that subjects did not measurably alter their decision threshold
for culpability. Figure 4 illustrates the finding by comparing the
decision curve from the last experiment-Experiment 4 (the "No
Instruction" condition)-with the new decision curve, reflecting the
"Knowledge Instruction." What's immediately striking, of course, is that
the curves are virtually identical. Specifically, the percentage of
subjects finding a defendant signaled as reckless guilty of violating a
statute that explicitly required actual knowledge was virtually the same
as the percentage who held the defendant liable when no mens rea was
prescribed-82% and 81%, respectively.
What these results demonstrate is that, at least in laboratory
conditions, juror intuitions about whether the defendant who behaved
negligently or recklessly when engaging in the illegal conduct should be
convicted appear to be unaffected by an explicit instruction prescribing
knowledge as the mental state required for conviction.

[Vol. 71:1:241

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

266

FIGURE 4: COMPARISON OF INSTRUCTION AND NO INSTRUCTION
CONDITIONS
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F. Experiment 6: The Effect of Instructions:Revisited
A puzzle emerges when comparing the results of Experiments 3
and 5. Recall that in Experiment 3 about 60% of the scenarios signaled
as demonstrating awareness of risk were characterized by the subjects
as constituting recklessness under the definitions provided (see Table
5). However, in Experiment 5 we saw that more than 80% of subjects
evaluating these same scenarios believed John was guilty of violating a
statute that conspicuously required knowledge as a predicate for
conviction (see Figure 3). Can these two findings be explained or
reconciled? Two possibilities come to mind: Perhaps twice as many
subjects in Experiment 5 found the distinction between knowledge and
recklessness to be confusing (when no definitions were provided) as did
those in Experiment 3 (when definitions were provided). Alternatively,
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perhaps being told that knowledge was required for guilt affected the
subjects' attributions of mental state.
To investigate further, we conducted Experiment 6, which was
identical to Experiment 5, except for the addition of a new question.
After presentation of the scenario and after eliciting the subjects'
decisions about whether the defendant should be convicted, subjects
were also asked to make a specific finding about the defendant's mental
state-i.e., to identify and select the defendant's mental state from the
list of definitions specifically tailored to the facts of the scenario. The
results, depicted in Figure 5, show that in the scenarios signaled as
involving awareness of risk (what we have been calling "recklessness"
scenarios), subjects were more likely to attribute knowledge to the actor
when told that knowledge was required for conviction (33%) than when
they were told to apply the definitions without being told about the legal
consequences of their finding (18%). Thus, Experiment 6 seems to show
that knowing that "knowledge" was required for conviction made
subjects more likely to attribute knowledge to the actor in ambiguous
scenarios than they would otherwise have been in a context where they
were not told the legal consequences of the attribution.
FIGURE 5: COMPARISON OF How SUBJECTS CLASSIFY AWARE OF THE
RISK SCENARIOS BASED ON WHETHER THE APPLICABLE STATUTE HAD A
KNOWLEDGE INSTRUCTION
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III. DISCUSSION
These experiments were designed to study attribution of mental
states based on postulated observations of a criminal actor's conduct
and the circumstances clearly known to him. They built on the
foundation laid in earlier studies by the research team, which used
structured scenarios to vary the harm caused by the actor and the
actor's mental state regarding that harm. Mental states were
operationalized based on the MPC's hierarchical framework. The
present study differed from those studies in two major respects. First,
rather than focusing on mens rea as to result elements (e.g., the death
of the victim), this study focused on the actor's mental state regarding
a material circumstance (e.g., the age of a sexual partner) in the
definition of the offense that differentiates lawful conduct from criminal
conduct. Second, whereas the previous study stipulated the actor's
mental state, the current study was designed to elicit subjects'
attributions of mental state to the actor based on descriptions of the
objectively observable circumstances relating to the actor's conduct.
A. Attributing Mental States
A man is stopped at the U.S. Border and his duffel bag contains
a large container of cocaine. In the United States it is illegal to
"knowingly or intentionally . . . possess a controlled substance." 33 The
man claims he had no idea the drugs were in the bag. In the absence of
a confession or direct observation of the defendant's incriminating
conduct, how are jurors to decide what the defendant knew or believed?
Do they do it in an acceptable manner? In this exploratory study, we
used scenarios to represent varying levels of evidence regarding the
existence of the legally material circumstance-such as the presence of
cocaine in a bag-as a basis for exploring the subjects' attributions of a
putative defendant's mental state pertaining to that circumstance.
On the upper end of the culpability hierarchy, "knowing" that
the circumstance exists (K) is distinguished categorically from all cases
where it is suspected but not "known" to exist (R). In order to isolate
clear cases of K, we modeled a case where the actor manifests
"knowledge" by his own conduct such as acknowledging the existence of
the material circumstance; in all other cases, however, whether the
actor "knows" or "believes" the circumstance exists or only "suspects"
that it does is a probabilistic attribution based on the strength of the
evidence.
33.

21 U.S.C.

§ 844

(2012).
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The second key categorical distinction in the MPC lies between
recklessness (R), which requires "awareness of the risk" that the
circumstance exists ("suspicion"), and negligence (N), which supposes
unawareness of the risk. To model attributions at the R-N boundary,
we formulated scenarios that raised strong suspicion (R) and that
raised only weak suspicion (N).
On the lower end of the culpability hierarchy, the distinction
between negligence (N) and blamelessness (B) lies in whether the actor
can fairly be blamed for not being aware of the risk under the
circumstance. We tried to model that distinction by including or
excluding facts or observations that ought to have raised suspicion
(suggesting that the defendant might be blameworthy for failing to be
alert to suspicious events). Across all of the mental states, the
underlying questions are: How likely was it that the material
circumstance existed, and was the actor blameworthy for taking the
risk-i.e., for engaging in what turned out to be illegal conduct?
Experiment 1 demonstrated that subjects' attributions of mental
state varied as expected depending on the strength of the evidence.
Thus, the subjects appear to have grasped the basic conceptual
distinctions being drawn by the MPC as we had modeled them.34 The
results from Experiment 1 indicate that with little to no training
subjects can apply the MPC framework in a manner that is largely
congruent with the basic assumptions of the MPC's mental state
hierarchy. For example, in all four mental state categories, the modal
response was what we characterized as the "best fit," and less than 10%
of the subjects gave responses suggesting that they fundamentally
misunderstood the task. 35 The findings in Experiment 1 gave us
sufficient confidence to undertake the remaining experiments.
Experiment 1 also confirmed one of the key hypotheses of the'
study as well as a premise of the experimental design-that subjects
would be rationally responsive to a request to attribute a "mental state"
as defined in the MPC based on inferences drawn from "evidence" about
the circumstances observed by the actor and descriptions of the actor's
behavior. Specifically, we expected subjects to be willing to ascribe to
the actor awareness of a fact, or suspicion about the existence of that
34. This observation is made only for purposes of evaluating our research method. It does not
represent a normative statement about how we expect jurors to behave in criminal cases.
35. Given the amount of experimental "noise" we might expect for a study of this kind, these
results are modestly encouraging about the ability of a typical person to interpret and apply the
MPC hierarchy. While subjects sometimes made responses that indicated to us that they may have
failed to understand critical legal distinctions presented to them (most notably, the 20% of
individuals who labelled the blameless scenarios as constituting negligence), on the whole there
were very few cases (less than 10%) where individuals provided responses indicating a failure to
appreciate the basic framework of the MPC's mens rea provisions.
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fact, even if the evidence did not show definitively that they knew it for
sure. In other words, we expected our research subjects to carry out the
assignment that real jurors are expected to carry out in any criminal
trial where the defendant has contested whether or not she had the
requisite mental state for a material circumstance. The findings in
Experiment 1 confirmed these assumptions. 36
B. From Attribution to Culpability
The most intriguing findings in this study emerged in
Experiments 4-6. First, Experiment 4 (building on the intermediate
steps taken in Experiments 2 and 3) shows that a strong suspicion that
the material circumstance existed was regarded by a large majority of
our subjects as a sufficient basis for culpability and punishment.
Second, Experiments 5 and 6 show that when knowledge was specified
as being necessary for conviction, strong suspicion that the material
circumstance existed was regarded as sufficient "proof' of knowledge.
1. Intuitions About Culpability and Punishment
Beginning with Experiment 4, we examined how subjects
conceived of the relationship between the MPC's mental state hierarchy
and criminal culpability. The results from Experiment 4 can be
characterized in two ways. First, most jury-eligible adults regard
recklessness as a necessary basis for criminal liability. That is, they do
not consider negligence to be a sufficient basis for criminalization in
most of the scenarios that were used in this study. 37 In this respect, they
share the intuition that led the MPC drafters to designate recklessness
as the presumptive floor for criminal culpability, insisting on an explicit
legislative justification to displace it with negligence. 38
Second, Experiment 4 also indicates that for the typical juryeligible participant in our experiments, recklessness regarding the
existence of the circumstance is sufficient for holding the defendant
36. It is important to emphasize the potentially controversial nature of those findings,
especially to readers who are puzzled, in an ontological sense, about whether it is ever possible to
prove, based on contestable inference, that a person "knew" something (or even that they suspected
something). Although this is not the place to take on such a profound question, it is the place to
say that our subjects were clearly willing to make these attributions based on contestable evidence.
This, of course, may be partly attributable to our design decision to exclude burdens of proof. One
would expect noticeably different results if we had included an instruction that the mental state
would have to be established "beyond a reasonable doubt." Future research can examine the extent
to which this may be true.
37. Our subjects recognized the distinction between negligence and recklessness, and most
apparently regarded negligence as an insufficient predicate for criminal liability.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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criminally liable in these scenarios. In fact, there is no material
difference in the proportion of subjects holding a defendant guilty when
the evidence strongly suggests that he "knows" that the circumstance
exists as compared to suspecting that it does. In other words, for the
typical jury-eligible adult, there is a threshold for culpability and it
exists not at knowledge, but at recklessness. This finding is especially
intriguing in light of the fact that most criminal statutes (including
drug possession, weapons possession, fraud, and identity theft) and
even some civil statutes (like patent infringement) require knowledge
as a necessary predicate for liability when the material circumstance
differentiates lawful from unlawful conduct, as did all of our scenarios.
To use the example above, though nearly all drug statutes require
knowledge for conviction, for the average jury-eligible American, mere
recklessness as to the presence of drugs in the bag is sufficient for
conviction.
What can explain this stunning result? Two accounts come to
mind. One line of explanation is that subjects are having trouble seeing
a conceptual difference between reckless and knowing conduct and,
because they cannot detect a difference between them, they are treated
as morally equivalent. While this account is plausible, it is incompatible
with the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, which showed that
subjects largely recognized the distinction between these mental states.
The second possible explanation for the finding that recklessness is
generally regarded as sufficient for criminal liability is that while
subjects can differentiate recklessness and knowledge, they simply do
not appreciate a moral distinction between them in relation to
circumstance elements of criminal offenses. In the context of the
scenarios used in this study, a substantial majority of our subjects
regarded putative defendants who correctly suspected that the material
circumstance existed as deserving of criminal punishment for "taking
the risk" that they were committing a criminal act.
This finding naturally implicates the underlying normative
question whether criminal statutes should require knowledge in some
or all of these offenses, or whether recklessness should be regarded as
a sufficient basis for punishment. The decision whether to require K or
R is particularly interesting because in most litigated cases,
unequivocal proof of knowledge is lacking and the key challenge is
whether the circumstances were so suspicious that the actor must have
"known" that that the material circumstance existed or, to use the MPC
definition of knowledge, 39 that that there was a "high probability" that
it existed. Given the MPC definitions of knowledge and recklessness,
39.

Id.

§

2.02(7).
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attribution of "knowledge" to the actor rather than recklessness turns
on whether there is a "high probability" that the circumstance existed
or only a "substantial risk" that it did. In this context, one wonders not
only about the determinacy of the distinction but also about the
normative case for prescribing a mens rea of knowledge rather than
recklessness.
Although the normative question reaches beyond our ambitions
here, it is worth noting that the choice between recklessness and
knowledge as a required mental state for material elements of offenses
is a matter of genuine controversy. Even if recklessness is a morally
sufficient basis for criminal liability, proof of knowledge might
sometimes be required as a hedge against erroneous attributions of
"conscious awareness of a risk" (i.e., suspicion). It is also noteworthy
that many jurisdictions treat what is typically called "willful blindness"
as a sufficient predicate for criminal punishment. 40 Under the doctrine
of willful blindness, a reckless actor can be found guilty under a statute
requiring knowledge insofar as the state can prove that the actor was
aware of the risk that the material circumstance existed and took
"deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact." 4 1 The possibility of
finding culpability without proof of "knowledge" can explain, in large
part, the intuitive appeal of the doctrine of willful blindness. At the
same time, however, some critics of the doctrine find proof of a conscious
decision not to find out to be an ephemeral (and unnecessary) burden
for the prosecution to bear in a case involving clearly reckless conduct, 4 2
while other critics find such proof insufficient to justify punishment
when a statute requires knowledge. 4 3

&

40. For a recent discussion of the case law, see Alexander F. Sarch, Willful Ignorance,
Culpability, and the Criminal Law, 88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1023 (2014).
41. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011). There is significant
controversy, however, about what "deliberately avoiding knowledge" requires. See, e.g., Deborah
Hellman, Willfully Blind for Good Reason, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 301 (2009); Douglas N. Husak
Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the "EqualCulpability" Thesis: A Study of
the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29; David Luban, Contrived
Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999); Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 953 (1998); Sarch, supra note 40.
42. Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1358
(1992) (concluding that no current formulation of willful ignorance describes a mental state that
is usually as reprehensible as knowledge); see also Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance,
88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 138-51 (2017) (arguing that willful ignorance should be expanded to
include reckless ignorance).
43. Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction:DeliberateIgnoranceas a CriminalMens Rea, 81
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990). However, Robbins recommends that legislatures
sometimes replace a knowledge requirement with a requirement of recklessness. Id. at 231-34.
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2. The Puzzling Impotency of the Knowledge Instruction
Experiment 5 demonstrates that the subjects were strongly
inclined to regard recklessness as a sufficient predicate for liability even
when the subjects are instructed that "knowledge" is requiredunder the
statute.4 4

What accounts for this eyebrow-raising observation? We can
think of several likely possibilities. One is that jurors are engaging in a
form of nullification: ignoring the statutory requirement for knowledge
given their moral intuition that a reckless defendant is a guilty
defendant. That is, jurors recognized that the defendant did not "know"
that the material circumstance existed, but decided that conviction was
warranted anyway. A second possibility is that the subjects were more
inclined to attribute knowledge to the defendant in ambiguous factual
scenarios when the statute prescribes knowledge as a necessary
predicate for conviction. A third possibility is that the subjects were not
attending to the statutory instruction despite the prominence we gave
it in the task, reflecting a general tendency to ignore statutory language
in favor of relying on bare intuitions regarding culpability. Finally, the
problem could have been lack of clarity in our instructions. Experiment
6 sought to better parse which of these explanations, if any, might
account for this result.
In Experiment 6, we found that nearly a third of those subjects
who would have likely attributed recklessness to the actor in the
absence of an instruction, attributed knowledge to the actor when they
were instructed that the statute required knowledge as a basis for a
finding of guilt. Thus, for many subjects, it would seem that the
statutory language was serving as an anchor for their mental state
attribution, and the attribution was perhaps being informed by their
collective intuition that strong suspicion is a sufficient basis for a
finding of culpability. In other words, the instruction, together with
their moral intuitions about culpability, channeled their attributions of
mental state. While giving the instruction led some subjects to attribute
a different mental state than they might otherwise have chosen, it is
unclear whether this reflected a conscious decision to ignore the
instructions, thereby nullifying the statutory language. We are inclined
to believe that the findings reflect a subconscious psychological
tendency to infer knowledge when knowledge is required for conviction
and the evidence revealed that the actor strongly suspected wrongdoing
and made a blameworthy decision to undertake the forbidden conduct.
But it is also possible that some participants may have consciously
44.

For information on the instruction, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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identified knowledge as being required for culpability under the statute
and commensurately attributed that same mental state in order to
provide concordance between their culpability determination, the
statute, and their intuitions about what constitutes culpable conduct.
The extent to which these two theories account for the observations
presented here cannot be resolved using the present experimental
design, and additional research is warranted.
C. Future Research
While numerous avenues of research are suggested by our
results, three are of primary importance to our team.
1. Willful Blindness
While the MPC has promulgated the canonical mental states
used in the present research, other mental states are actively used in a
number of jurisdictions. One prominent example is willful blindness.
Ongoing research by our group is exploring how the addition of willful
blindness as a response option in tasks such as those described above
shifts how participants categorize the offender's mental state. Early
results indicate that most participants appear to see it as a natural
explanation for offender conduct. If this finding holds up, its connection
to the results presented above showing that recklessness is widely seen
as the threshold for culpability will be explored in upcoming work.
2. The Effect of Hindsight Bias and Wrongful Conduct Bias
The scenarios used in this study test subjects' ability to
distinguish someone else's knowledge of a fact from mere suspicion of
its existence. How can a juror (or anyone else) ever know (much less
"beyond a reasonable doubt") whether a criminal defendant knew or
suspected something? These attributions have rarely been empirically
studied in a legal context. Are they affected by known tendencies, biases
or "rules of thumb"? Two such tendencies or biases are known to affect
decisions of this nature and are worthy of further examination of the
role they play in mental state attribution.
The first of these biases is hindsight bias. In our scenarios we
always concluded the scenario by informing subjects that the
circumstance in question did, in fact, exist. In this way our scenarios
more closely parallel criminal cases typically presented to jurors. 45
45. Inchoate offenses often involve situations where the circumstance did not exist. One
example of such a case would be a charge for attempt when the victim was nonexistent. The most
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However, by informing subjects that the circumstance actually existed
it becomes impossible for subjects to objectively evaluate the probability
it existed before that fact was known. This is known as hindsight bias
and has been demonstrated to govern nearly all types of decisionmaking
where it has been empirically examined. It has even been demonstrated
to explain behavior of judges. 46 The extent to which juror knowledge of
the outcome affects unbiased evaluation of the subjective and objective
probability at the time of the offender's conduct is an interesting line of
empirical and conceptual research. 47
The second bias that may explain subjects' willingness to ascribe
intentionality is known as the Knobe effect. 48 The Knobe effect explains
the observed phenomenon that when a behavior has a negative
externality, subjects are much more likely to ascribe intentionality to
the actor with regard to that externality than when the behavior has a
positive externality. In other words, by the very fact that the conduct
we are speaking of here is wrongful and possibly harmful, we may be
seeing that subjects are more willing to ascribe intentionality than they
otherwise may be for neutral or positive conduct. Future studies can
examine how subjects ascribe mental states with and without the
information about whether the criminal circumstance actually exists,
and perhaps with information that the circumstance does not actually
exist. By doing so it may be possible to better parse the extent to which
these biases affect the observed results.
3. Patterns and Correlates of Attributions
As expected, findings in all of our experiments reflected
variations in attribution of mental states among the subjects.
Unfortunately, our study was not designed to probe the patterns and
correlates of these variations. However, we expect future research to
explore the correlates of variations in attribution of specific mental
common example of such a case is a child sex abuse sting where the "victims" were in fact officers
posing as young children. For a discussion of the mens rea considerations in cases such as these,
see Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown in a Virtual
World in Light of the FantasyDefense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 547-77 (2000).
46. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007).
47. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998).
48. Joshua Knobe, IntentionalAction and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS
190, 190-94 (2003) (describing an experiment wherein the author asked individuals whether a
CEO that made a business decision based purely on a financial basis intentionally harmed the
environment when he had been told that environmental harm would be a byproduct of the business
decision. The vast majority (82%) said yes. When provided with the same probe with the only
change being that the outcome of the business decision helped the environment, fewer than one in
four said that the businessman intended to help the environment).
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states (e.g., K v. R and R v. N) and in the truly intriguing variations in
subjects' intuitions about what level of awareness warrants
punishment. Another important question is whether and to what extent
jury-eligible subjects might vary in the willingness to attribute
culpability depending on the relative strength of "suspicion" aroused by
the evidence. For example, as noted above, one hypothesis is that people
in general (or a subset, perhaps) may show hindsight bias in being more
likely to attribute culpability (e.g., R) in ambiguous situations when the
contested circumstance is known to have existed, as it was in all of our
scenarios.
CONCLUSION

There are few more iconic moments in law than when jurors
decide whether a defendant possessed a culpable state of mind-and if
so which one-at the time of a bad act. But how do jurors actually
decode past mental states of defendants? Despite the enormous
consequences of these daily decisions for life and liberty, little, in fact,
is known.
In six new exploratory studies, we empirically examined how
jury-eligible adults went about deciding whether a hypothetical
defendant-who had committed the actus reus of a criminal offensealso had the requisite "guilty mind" about a circumstance element in
the definition of the offense. Our research focused on two specific and
fundamental questions.
First, how do subjects go about drawing inferences about a
person's mental state with respect to some legally relevant fact (such as
the presence of contraband drugs inside a package) at the time the
person committed an offense? Second, how do subjects evaluate the
culpability of persons exhibiting different Model Penal Code mental
states as to such facts? In answering both questions, we examined
whether juror behavior and intuition were congruent with basic
assumptions of the criminal law.
Briefly put, our experiments produced the following results.
> With little to no training, subjects appear to grasp the
mens rea distinctions drawn by the MPC (at least as
these distinctions pertain to circumstance elements of
crimes). Moreover,
subjects can apply those
distinctions to fact patterns in a manner largely
consistent with basic assumptions of the MPC
hierarchy of culpable mental states. (Experiment 1).
> Subjects also appear to have a shared moral
understanding of what level of culpability should be
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criminally punishable-that is, what constitutes a
"guilty mind." Strikingly, however, most subjects find
a reckless mental state to be not only necessary for
conviction, but also sufficient for it. (Experiments 24).
> Subjects are inclined to hold a defendant responsible
when he is demonstrably aware of a risk that a legally
relevant circumstance exists, even in the face of some
uncertainty about whether he actually knows that it
does. Moreover, and surprisingly, this inclination
persists even when subjects are instructed that
knowledge that the circumstance existed is legally
required for conviction. (Experiment 5). This
intriguing finding suggests that subjects are aligning
their descriptive judgment about what mental state
the actor possesses with their moral intuition that the
actor is sufficiently culpable to be punished.
(Experiment 6).
Our team is hesitant to draw sweeping conclusions from the
results of these studies. And indeed even amongst ourselves we are in
some disagreement about potential implications. Nonetheless, two
general conclusions seem clear.
First, stakeholders in the criminal justice system can take some
comfort that jury-eligible subjects appear to understand the MPC mens
rea categories when it comes to circumstance elements, and that
subjects are largely able to apply those categories in the way the
drafters of the MPC, and legislatures adopting the MPC, expected.
Second, this comfort comes with a caveat: subjects not only find
(unsurprisingly) that a defendant's awareness of a significant risk that
a legally relevant circumstance exists is sufficient for criminal
culpability, they also conclude that the same level of awareness is
sufficient in the face of a statute that permits conviction only if the
defendant knows that it exists. Put another way, when faced with a
tension between their moral intuition that what the law calls
recklessness is enough for conviction, on one hand, and the existence of
statutory language that requires a defendant's knowledge, on the other,
subjects tend simply to find that the actor possessed knowledge, even
when the contexts arguably demonstrate that the actor was only
reckless.
More work will be needed, clearly, to fully mine the implications
of these findings. In the meantime, however, our research could have
important consequences for legislatures, appellate courts, and trial
judges who are trying to decide whether a defendant needs to know a
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fact to be criminally responsible, or merely needs to be reckless or
negligent.
Criminal law scholars have long debated the mental state and
culpability criteria that should be necessary and sufficient for criminal
liability. But they have paid too little attention to the question of how a
jury actually draws the culpability distinctions that are theoretically
relevant if the criminal law is to perform its retributive, deterrent,
incapacitating, and expressive functions. Our novel empirical studies
squarely address that question and offer some highly intriguing, albeit
preliminary, answers.
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APPENDIX A: THE SUBJECTS

Individuals were recruited to participate in our experiments
between November 2015 and October 2016. All recruitment and
experimental procedures were approved by the Vanderbilt Institutional
Review Board. 49 All recruitment was done online using Amazon's
Mechanical Turk service ("AMT'). AMT is a marketplace where
individuals from across the globe can perform various tasks for
payment from various providers. Research using these web-based
recruiting techniques has been widely validated and also provides
samples of the population that are substantially more representative
than samples of convenience typically used in such studies.5 0
Nonetheless, there is always the possibility, when subjects are
participating remotely, that they may not be fully attending to the task
at hand. In order to account for this, we excluded subjects who took an
abnormal amount of time to respond.5 1 We also included an attentional
52
check that screened out subjects who did not read the material closely
and we only used subjects who had an established history of
satisfactorily completing tasks on AMT.5 3
Subjects agreeing to participate through AMT were then
directed to the experiment, which was hosted by Qualtrics. Qualtrics is
a web-based platform for hosting surveys and experiments. It is
regularly used by scholars in many fields and was also used by this
group of authors for our previous two studies described in Section III.A,

49. The Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board ensures that approved studies are
in compliance with both federal guidelines and widely held norms for human experimentation.
50. See, e.g., Tara S. Behrend et al., The Viability of Crowdsourcingfor Survey Research, 43
BEHAv. RES. METHODS 800 (2011); Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351 (2012); Michael
Buhrmester et al., Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality,
Data?, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011); Joseph K Goodman et al., Data Collection in a Flat
World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples, 26 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 213 (2013); Jon Sprouse, A Validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk for the Collection of
Acceptability Judgments in Linguistic Theory, 43 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 155 (2011).
51. Subjects whose timing was two standard deviations faster or slower than the average
participant were excluded. This is a customary screening technique to detect noncompliance with
task instructions.
52. In addition to the fact patterns contained in Appendix B, subjects were presented with a
fact pattern that looked like a normal fact pattern but had a sentence in the middle of the
paragraph that read, "This is an attention check. Please ignore the rest of this text and select a
response of [specific response varied depending on the experiment] to confirm that you are reading
these scenarios carefully." All subjects selecting a response other than the directed response were
excluded from the analysis.
53. Note that in this regard the steps that we took to ensure the complete attention of our
subjects may be more rigorous than those methods used by courts.
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above. 54 At the conclusion of their participation subjects were debriefed
and paid.
Before participating in our studies, Amazon confirmed that all
potential participants were U.S. citizens or residents over the age of
eighteen by means of a U.S. based bank account as well as their IP
address.5 5 All experiments ended with subjects providing some
demographic information, which allowed us to confirm that the sample
was generally representative of the U.S. jury-eligible population. We
provide the summary statistics of this sample as compared to the U.S.
population in Table Al. Table A2 then lists the total number of subjects
per experiment.

54. Studies relying on Qualtrics experiments include Jonathan S. Abramowitz et al.,
Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms: The Contribution of Obsessional Beliefs and Experiential
Avoidance, 23 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 160, 162 (2009); Yany Gr6goire et al., When Customer Love
Turns into LastingHate: The Effects of Relationship Strength and Time on Customer Revenge and
Avoidance, J. MARKETING, Nov. 2009, at 18, 21; and Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of
Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2000, 2004 (2010).
55. Subject totals for each experiment were based on power analyses that indicated the totals
that would be sufficient for us to either confirm or reject the hypothesis being tested. Power
analyses allow for experimenters to determine the probability of a false negative (that is,
concluding no difference exists when one actually does) and reduce this probability to widely
accepted levels.
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Al: DEMOGRAPHICS OF EXPERIMENTAL
SUBJECTS

Education

Subjects

U.S. Census

Less than HS
High school / GED
Some college
Assoc. degree
Bachelor's
Graduate Degree

<1%
10%
26%
13%
38%
13%

18%
30%
20%
7%
17%
10%

Income

Subjects

U.S. Census

<$20k
$20k - $40k
$40k - $60k
$60k - $80k
$80k-$100k
> $100k

25%
30%
21%
9%
11%
5%

$1 to $25k: 22%
$25k to $35k: 19%
$35k to $50k: 21%
$50k to $65k: 14%
$65kto $75k:6%
$75k to $100k: 8%

Gender

Subjects

U.S. Census

Male
Female

53%
46%

49%
51%

A&e Groups

Subjects

U.S. Census

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

12%
46%
22%
12%
6%
2%

13%
18%
18%
19%
16%
18%

Race

Subjects

U.S. Census

White
Non-White

77%
23%

74%
26%
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A2: NUMBER OF SUBJECTS BY EXPERIMENT

Experiment
1. Attributing Mental States Using MPC Definitions
2. Subjects' Unguided Moral Intuitions About What Mental State
Is Sufficient for Criminal Liability
3. Use of Signals to Align Subjects' Responses with the Best Fit
Mental State
4. Subjects' Unguided Intuitions About Culpability Sufficient for
Criminal Liability: Revisited
5. The Effect of Instructions
6. The Effect of Instructions: Revisited
TOTAL SUBJECTS, ACROSS ALL EXPERIMENTS

Number of
Subjects
118

95
119
99
103
94
628
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APPENDIX B: FULL TEXT OF SCENARIOS

Appendix B details the full set of sixty-three scenarios used in
the experiments. Due to its length, it is provided online at this location:
[https://perma.cc/8SDDhttp://www.lawneuro.org/AppendixB.pdf
SBGP].

